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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the impact of correlation
between the energy and information links in wireless power transfer
systems, from a physical layer security perspective. With that aim,
we first determine how correlation can affect system capacity in
practical energy harvesting set-ups in the absence of eavesdroppers.
We quantify that even though link correlation improves the average
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for a fixed transmit power, it also
increases its variance, which ultimately degrades capacity. Based
on this observation, we show that correlation between the energy
and information links may be detrimental/beneficial for the secrecy
capacity in the high/low legitimate SNR regime, whenever such
correlation affects the legitimate user. Conversely, we also point
out that when link correlation for the wiretap link is rigorously
accounted for, it barely affects secrecy performance, causing only
a minor degradation in some instances.
Index Terms—Secrecy capacity, outage probability, eavesdropper,
wireless power transfer, capacity, correlation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last years, the number of devices connected to
wireless networks has been dramatically increasing due to the
advent of 5G technology [1] and the development of the Internet
of Things (IoT) [2]. In this line, Energy Harvesting (EH)
technology [3, 4], which allows devices to harvest the energy
required for operation in a wireless fashion, is one of the
key enablers for massive wireless sensor deployment. Perhaps
the most feasible use case in this scenario is Wireless Power
Transmission (WPT) [5, 6], which employs dedicated Power
Beacons (PBs) to wirelessly convey energy to the network
agents.
Wireless Powered Communication (WPC) systems [7] inte-
grate WPT technology with traditional wireless communications,
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operating in a number of forms which may include Simultaneous
Wireless and Information Power Transfer (SWIPT) alternatives.
In many cases, WPT-based solutions imply a bidirectional
operation between the EH node and the PB: for instance, the PB
wirelessly transmits energy to the EH node to provide it with
enough power as to report some information back to the PB.
This is also the conventional mode of operation of backscatter
communication systems [8]. In both instances, this translates into
a clear line-of-sight (LOS) between the system agents, which
combined with the slow variability of fading in these scenarios
implies a non-negligible correlation between the information and
energy transfer links [9, 10].
The effect of correlation between the energy and information
links in WPC systems has been scarcely taken care of in the liter-
ature, being the only available references focused on backscatter
communication systems [10–13]. Such lack of reference works is
even intensified in the context of Physical Layer Security (PLS)
[14]. In this scenario, communication between legitimate peers
is observed by an external eavesdropper, which complicates the
problem under analysis because of adding a new wireless link.
Indeed, the correlation between the desired and eavesdropper’s
links has been analyzed in the literature [15, 16]; however, the
effect of correlation between energy and information transfer
links in the context of WPC has only been partially addressed in
[17]. In this work, we aim to shed light on this issue, with one
key question in mind: is correlation between the information
and energy links beneficial in some way for physical layer
security in WPC? This is a rather challenging problem to be
solved from a mathematical viewpoint, for which we provide a
clear procedure to derive the key secrecy performance metrics
for an arbitrary choice of fading distribution, as well as some
specific examples for the case of Rician and Rayleigh fading.
Besides, the effect of correlation on the average signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) at the receiver ends needs to be correctly accounted
for; we will later see that whenever the interaction between
the average SNRs at the legitimate and eavesdropper’s sides is
neglected, the conclusions about the effect of correlation could
be incorrect in some instances.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the
system set-up under consideration is introduced in Section II. In
Section III, we first examine the effect of correlation in a WPC
system in the absence of eavesdroppers. After that, in Section
IV-A we analyze the effect of correlation in PLS in different
practical scenarios. Finally, in Section V the main conclusions
are summarized.
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Fig. 1. Wireless power transfer-based system set-up
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the system set-up in Fig 1. A legitimate user
(Alice) operates thanks to the energy wirelessly conveyed by a
remote PB. Now, Alice wants to communicate with a legitimate
user (Bob) over a wireless fading channel, in the presence
of a non-legitimate user (Eve) capable of eavesdropping on
Alice-Bob’s transmissions. The links between Alice and Bob
(legitimate link) and between Alice and Eve (wiretap link) will
be referred to as information links, whereas the link between
PB and Alice will be denoted as the energy link. For simplicity,
yet without loss of generality, we consider that the time-
sharing protocol proposed in [18] is used, where the energy
and information phases have a duration of T/2 seconds, with T
being the time slot duration.
In Fig. 1, P0 is the available power at Alice’s transmitter,
where the function g(·) indicates the EH behavior, which in
general will not be linear. Similarly, PI is the available power
at the input of the EH (Alice), which can be expressed as
PI = PTLP dP
−α|hP |2, (1)
where PT is the transmitted power by the PB, LP incorporates
the gains of the transmit and receive antennas and frequency-
dependent propagation losses, dP is the distance between the
PB and Alice and α is the path loss exponent.
The channels hP , hB and hE are in charge of incorporating
the random effects of multipath fading over the transmitted
signal. Without loss of generality, we consider normalized
fading channel coefficients so that E{|hP |2} = E{|hB |2} =
E{|hE |2} = 1, where E{·} is the expectation operator. We
also assume that channels are quasi-static fading channels,
(i.e. constant during the transmission of given codeword, yet
independent between codewords unless otherwise stated), and
the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) also affects the
communication through information links.
Now, depending on the scenario under consideration, channel
correlation can be incorporated in different ways. In this paper,
we will consider two situations: (i) the energy and legitimate
links are correlated; and (ii) the energy and wiretap links are
correlated. The former situation corresponds to the case on
which the PB also plays the role of Bob, and Alice uses the
energy obtained from the PB to report back some information to
him. The latter scenario represents the case of an untrusted PB,
so Alice wants that the information transmitted to an external
legitimate user Bob remains confidential to the PB, which now
acts as Eve.
The instantaneous SNR at both receiver ends will be given
by:
γB =
P0LBdB
−α
N0
|hB |2 (2)
γE =
P0LEdE
−α
N0
|hE |2 (3)
where N0 is the noise power, P0 = g(PTLP dP−α |hP |2), dB
and dE are the distances between Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve,
respectively, and {LB , LE} are defined in a similar way as LP .
The theoretical formulations in this work will be valid for an
arbitrary choice of fading distributions. However, because the
links in WPC are of inherent LOS nature, we will specifically
consider that the different fading channel coefficients are mod-
eled by the Rician distribution, which is characterized by the
parameter K defined as the ratio between the LOS and non-
LOS powers. Now, denoting as hI the information link (either
legitimate or wiretap) that is correlated with the energy link, we
have that the normalized fading channels are expressed as
hP =
√
K
K + 1
+
√
1
K + 1
z1, (4)
hI =
√
K
K + 1
+
√
1
K + 1
(
ρ z1 +
√
1− ρ2 z2
)
, (5)
with ρ = cov(hP ,hI)√
var(hP )var(hI)
being the correlation coefficient, and
z1 and z2 being two ancillary complex normal RVs. Note that
for K = 0, the scenario reduces to the case of Rayleigh fading.
III. EFFECT OF CORRELATION IN SYSTEM’S CAPACITY
A. Preliminary definitions
In order to understand the effect of correlation in the in-
vestigated set-up, we first will consider an eavesdropper-free
scenario. In this situation, the receive SNR will be given by (2).
For simplicity, and because of the inherent complexity associated
to considering correlation, we will assume that the non-linear
EH operates in the linear region so that the saturation effect
associated to its operation can be neglected. Thus, our results
can be seen as an upper bound on the achievable performance.
Under these premises, we have that PO ≈ ηPI , with η being
the EH efficiency. So, we can express γB as
γB =
PTLP dP
−αηLBdB−α
N0︸ ︷︷ ︸
γIB=PT /NE
|hP |2︸ ︷︷ ︸
x
|hB |2︸ ︷︷ ︸
y
. (6)
For convenience of discussion, we define the parameter γIB
as the ratio between the PB transmit power and a constant
term NE , which can be regarded as the system’s noise referred
to the PB output. We note that γIB reduces to the average
SNR at the receiver side only in the absence of correlation.
In such case, we have E{xy} = E{x}E{y} = 1 because of the
definition of normalized channel gains. In the general case of
correlation between the energy and information links, we have
that E{xy} > 1.
3B. Performance analysis
In order to analyze the effect of correlation, we use two classi-
cal performance metrics for benchmarking: average capacity and
outage probability. The average capacity per bandwidth unit is
defined as
C , E {log2(1 + γB)} =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + γ)fγB (γ)dγ, (7)
whereas the outage probability (OP) is defined as the probability
that the instantaneous SNR (or equivalently, the instantaneous
capacity) falls below a predefined threshold, i.e.
OP = Pr {log2(1 + γB) < Rth} = Pr
{
γB < γ
th
}
, (8)
with γth = 2Rth − 1.
We will now describe how these performance metrics can
be derived from the joint distribution of x = |hP |2 and
y = |hB |2. Even though the correct derivation only requires the
use of standard techniques of transformation of random variables
(e.g. see [19, ch. 6]), the complicated form of the bivariate
distributions of x and y for most fading distributions makes
it hard to evaluate the performance in a simple form. Starting
from the bivariate PDF of x and y, we can obtain the PDF of
the RV u = x · y as [19, eq. 6.74]
fu(u) =
∫ ∞
0
1
t
fx,y
(
t,
u
t
)
dt, (9)
and then we can obtain
C =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1 + γ
I
B · u)fu(u)du (10)
and
OP = Fu
(
γth/γIB
)
=
∫ γth/γIB
0
fu(u)du, (11)
where Fu(u) is the CDF of u. For the general case of Rice fading
the bivariate distribution has a rather intricate form, which is here
reproduced for the readers’ convenience [20]:
fx,y(x, y) =
(K + 1)2
1− ρ2 e
− K+1
1−ρ2 (x+y)e−
2K
1+ρ×
∞∑
k=0
εkIk (α
√
xy) Ik
(
β
√
x
)
Ik (β
√
y) , (12)
with α = 2ρ(K+1)1−ρ2 , β =
2
1+ρ
√
K(K + 1), Ik(·) the modified
Bessel function of the first kind and order k, and εk being the
Neumann constant ε0 = 1 and εk>0 = 2. Unfortunately, the
derivation of tractable performance metrics for the correlated
Rician case is not possible, and double integral expressions are
required for the evaluation of the capacity and outage probability.
However, they can be easily computed with standard numerical
integration routines (e.g. using integral in MATLAB).
From the definitions in (4), (5) and (6), and after some
manipulations we can see that
E{γB} = γB = γIB
K2 + 2K(1 + ρ) + 1 + ρ2
(K + 1)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆PO
. (13)
which for Rayleigh fading reduces to E{γB} = γIB(1 + ρ2).
A first remark is in order at this point: we can see that for a
fixed transmit power PT , the average SNR at the receiver end
is increased due to correlation, i.e., γB ≥ γIB , or in other words
∆PO ≥ 1. While this may seem beneficial from a system design
perspective, it also increases the variance of the equivalent
composite channel, which implies a larger fading severity.
We can use the previous results to obtain an approximate
expression for the average capacity in the high SNR regime, in
the form
C ≈ log2(γB)− t. (14)
The term t can be regarded as a capacity loss with respect to the
AWGN case (i.e., the absence of fading), and can be computed
from the expression of the moments of γB = γIB · u following
the procedure described in [21]. In our case, obtaining a closed-
form expression for the moments can be complicated due to
the intractable form of the probability density function (PDF)
of γB . However, in the case of independent links, the moments
of γB can be computed from the product of the moments of
independent Rician random variables (RVs). Thus, the capacity
loss in the Rician product channel is twice the capacity loss of
the single Rician link (e.g., given in [22]), i.e.
t(ρ=0) = 2
(
log2
(
K + 1
K
)
− log2(e)E1(K)
)
, (15)
where E1(·) is the exponential integral function. Now, the scale
factor ∆PO is translated into an additional capacity penalty for
a fixed γB , as in [13]. Thus, we can express from (13):
t =t(ρ=0) + t(ρ) = t(ρ=0) + log2(∆PO)
=t(ρ=0) + log2
(
K2 + 2K(1 + ρ) + 1 + ρ2
(K + 1)2
)
(16)
We can see that the capacity loss t grows as K is reduced or
as ρ is increased, so that system performance is expected to be
degraded with correlation and the absence of LOS. We note that
(16) reduces to the results recently given in [13] for the Rayleigh
case, since limK→0
{
log
(
K+1
K
)− E1(K)} = γe, where γe is
the Euler-Mascheroni constant and log is the natural logarithm.
Due to the unwieldy nature of the distribution of the product
of correlated Rician RVs, we will now pay attention to the
simplified case of Rayleigh fading. In order to better understand
the effect of correlation on fading severity, we can also resort
to the amount of fading (AoF) parameter, which for the case of
a correlated Rayleigh product channel can be computed as
AoF =
E[γ2B ]
γ2B
− 1 = 4(1 + p(4 + p))
(1 + p)2
− 1, (17)
where p = ρ2 for the sake of shorthand notation, and we used
the definition of the PDF given in [20, eq. 6.55] as:
fγB (γ) =
2
γB
1+p
1−pI0
(
2
1−p
√
pγ(1+p)
γB
)
K0
(
2
1−p
√
γ(1+p)
γB
)
,
(18)
where Kν(·) is ν-th order modified Bessel functions of the
second kind, and E{γB} = γB denotes the average SNR at
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Fig. 2. Average capacity C vs. γB , for different values of the correlation
coefficient through p = ρ2 and LOS conditions through K. Solid lines
correspond to theoretical expressions using (10) and (7). Dashed lines correspond
to the asymptotic results using (14). Markers correspond to MC simulations.
the receiver. As predicted by the asymptotic capacity results,
we see that as p grows the AoF increases, so that fading sever-
ity increases with correlation and ultimately degrades system
performance.
The OP can be directly computed by evaluating the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of γB , i.e., OP = FγB
(
γth
)
, with
FγB (γ) = 1− a
√
γ [I0(a
√
pγ)K1(a
√
γ)+√
pI1(a
√
pγ)K0(a
√
γ)] , (19)
which is obtained by manipulating the expression in [23, eq. 6],
with a = 21−p
√
1+p
γB
.
C. Numerical results
In Figs. 2 and 3, we evaluate the average capacity and the
OP as a function of the average received SNR, for different
values of the correlation coefficient through p = ρ2. For the OP
evaluation, we set Rth = 1 bps/Hz. The infinite series expression
required for the evaluation of the performance metrics in the
Rician case has been truncated to 10 terms, which is sufficient
for an excellent match with Monte Carlo (MC) simulations.
We see that in all instances, correlation degrades system per-
formance when compared to the case of independent energy
and information links. However, the effect of link correlation is
reduced as the LOS condition is increased. i.e. as K grows. As
discussed in [13], the average capacity loss due to correlation
implies that a power offset is required in the presence of
correlation in order to obtain the same capacity. Interestingly,
such power offset ∆dBPO = 10 log10(∆PO) dB is compensated
by the fact that the required transmit power PT is reduced in
the event of correlation by a factor of E{xy} = ∆PO. Hence,
the performance loss due to correlation is compensated by the
increase in average SNR for a fixed power budget. However, this
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Fig. 3. Outage probability vs. γB , for different values of the correlation
coefficient through p = ρ2 and LOS conditions through K. Solid lines
correspond to theoretical expressions using (11) and (19). Markers correspond
to MC simulations.
does not seem the case for the OP (at least for operational ranges
of low OPs), for which the power offset required to achieve a
target OP is much larger, as observed in Fig. 3.
IV. EFFECT OF CORRELATION ON SECRECY CAPACITY
A. Preliminary definitions
We will now analyze the effect of channel correlation on the
physical layer security performance of the system model under
consideration. Such secure performance is quantified through the
secrecy capacity CS, defined as [14]:
CS , max{log2(1 + γB)− log2(1 + γE), 0}. (20)
Depending on the assumptions taken regarding availability of
channel state information (CSI) at the different agents, the OP
of secrecy capacity or the average secrecy capacity are the usual
metrics to characterize the performance in this context, namely
OPSC , Pr{log2(1 + γB)− log2(1 + γE) < Rth}. (21)
CS , E
γB>γE
{log2(1 + γB)− log2(1 + γE)}, (22)
Note that in order to analytically calculate these performance
metrics, the joint distribution of γB and γE is required. De-
pending on the way that channel correlation is incorporated
between the energy and information links, such distribution will
take different forms. The two scenarios described in Section
II, namely (i) correlation between the energy and legitimate
information link and (ii) correlation between the energy and
wiretap link, are tackled in the next subsections.
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Fig. 4. Scenario 1: Correlation between the energy and legitimate information
links.
B. Correlation between WPT and Bob’s links
We first consider the case on which Bob plays the role
of PB, whereas Alice is the EH device. Both agents wish to
communicate in the presence of an external eavesdropper Eve,
for which its wireless channel is statistically independent to the
ones between Alice and Bob. Hence, the correlation parameter
ρ will capture the correlation between the energy and legitimate
information links. This scenario, depicted in Fig. 4, can be
regarded as an extension of that considered in the previous
section, only that now adding Eve to the system under analysis.
We must note that while the average SNR at Bob may be
increased due to correlation for a fixed PT , this effect does not
take place on the average SNR experienced by Eve. Similarly,
if we set a fixed average SNR at Bob, the required transmit
power by the PB is reduced because of correlation by a factor
∆PO = E{|hP |2 |hB |2}. Hence, this causes a reduction on the
average SNR at Eve by the same factor, which seems beneficial
from a physical layer security perspective. In any case, it is
clear that despite correlation may not be present between the
energy and eavesdropper’s links, it clearly influences the relation
between the average SNRs at the legitimate and eavesdropper’s
ends. This effect has been overlooked in the literature, and not
properly introduced to the best of our knowledge, e.g., see [17]
for an OPSC analysis in the presence of correlation in the context
of backscatter communications.
The derivation of analytical expressions for the secrecy per-
formance metrics is even more complicated than in the scenario
tackled in Section III. For this reason, we aim to describe how
the evaluation of these performance metrics can be carried out in
a general form. Let us express the instantaneous secrecy capacity
in (10) in a more convenient form:
CS = max
{
log2
(
1 + γIBx · y
1 + γEx · z
)
, 0
}
. (23)
where x = |hP |2, y = |hB |2 and z = |hE |2. Now, defining
u = x · y and v = x · z, we can obtain the joint distribution of u
and v from the joint distribution of x, y, and z. In the scenario
under consideration, we have that
fx,y,z(x, y, z) = fx,y(x, y) · fz(z), (24)
because of the independence of the eavesdropper’s link. Defining
the ancillary RV w = z, we can compute the joint distribution
of u and v using standard techniques of transformation of RVs
as
fu,v(u, v) =
∫ ∞
0
fu,v,w(u, v, w)dw,
=
∫ ∞
0
fx,y(v/w, uw/v) · fz(w)∣∣∣∂(u,v,w)∂(x,y,z) ∣∣∣ dw,
=
∫ ∞
0
1
v
fx,y(v/w, uw/v) · fz(w)dw, (25)
where
∣∣∣∂(u,v,w)∂(x,y,z) ∣∣∣ = v is the Jacobian of the RV transformation.
Now, (25) can be used to derive the secrecy performance metrics
as
CS =
∫ ∞
0
∫ uγIB/γE
0
log2
(
1 + γIBu
1 + γEv
)
fu,v(u, v)dvdu (26)
OPSC =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
max{0,bu−c}
fu,v(u, v)dvdu, (27)
with b = γIB/
(
2RthγE
)
and c =
(
2Rth − 1) / (2RthγE)
It is evident that obtaining analytical expressions for these
metrics in the general case of Rician fading seems unlikely. In
the simplified case of Rayleigh fading, it is possible to obtain a
closed form expression of fu,v(u, v) by integrating the bivariate
distribution of two correlated Rayleigh RVs [20] as in (25),
yielding
fu,v(u, v) =
α√
u+2v/α
I0 (α
√
up)K1
(
α
√
u+ 2v/α
)
(28)
where again p = ρ2 and α = 2/(1− p). Plugging (28) in (27),
we obtain a single integral expression for the OP of secrecy
capacity by direct integration as
OPSC =
∫ ∞
0
g(u)du, (29)
with
g(u) = αI0 (α
√
up)K0
(
α
√
u+ 2 max{0, bu− c}/α
)
. (30)
The average secrecy capacity is far more intricate to be com-
puted analytically, although once again the powerful numerical
integration routines included in MATLAB or MATHEMATICA
can be used to evaluate this metric. However, we can resort to
an asymptotic approximation in the high SNR regime inspired
by the analysis in [24] as:
CS ≈CB − CE , (31)
≈ log2(γB)− t− CE . (32)
In this case, CB (or equivalently, t) can be computed following
the procedure detailed in Section III, while CE is the capacity
of an uncorrelated product channel.
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Fig. 5. Scenario 2: Correlation between the energy and wiretap links.
C. Correlation between WPT and Eve’s links
We now analyze the case on which the EH device, Alice,
wishes to communicate to a legitimate device Bob while keeping
the information confidential from the PB that conveys energy
to her. We refer to this scenario as secure communication in
the presence of an untrusted PB. We note that this scenario on
which the PB plays the role of Eve has not been addressed in
the literature to the best of our knowledge.
The differences between the scenario under consideration and
that in Section IV-B are given as follows: in this configuration,
the energy and wiretap links are correlated and identically
distributed, and in general will exhibit a LOS condition. Now,
the legitimate link is agnostic to correlation, which implies that
the average SNR at Bob’s receiver is not modified because of
correlation for a given PT . However, in this case correlation
affects the composite energy-wiretap link in two ways: for
a fixed PT , the average SNR received at the PB (i.e., Eve)
is now increased by a factor ∆PO = E{|hP |2 |hE |2}, i.e.
γE = γ
I
E∆PO, where γ
I
E is the average SNR at Eve in the
case of independent links. Besides, correlation increases fading
severity for such composite link, which also impacts capacity of
the wiretap link.
Let us follow a similar approach as in the previous subsection
to describe the general way to computing the secrecy perfor-
mance metrics in this scenario. Starting from the expression in
(23), and using the same definitions for x, y, and z, we now
have that
fx,y,z(x, y, z) = fx,z(x, z) · fy(y), (33)
because of the independence of the legitimate link. We now
define the ancillary RV w = y, and then compute the joint
distribution of u and v as
fu,v(u, v) =
∫ ∞
0
fu,v,w(u, v, w)dw,
=
∫ ∞
0
fx,z(u/w, vw/u) · fy(w)∣∣∣∂(u,v,w)∂(x,y,z) ∣∣∣ dw,
=
∫ ∞
0
1
u
fx,z(u/w, vw/u) · fy(w)dw. (34)
In this case (34) can be used to evaluate the secrecy performance
metrics as
CS =
∫ ∞
0
∫ uγB/γIE
0
log2
(
1 + γBu
1 + γIEv
)
fu,v(u, v)dvdu (35)
OPSC =
∫ ∞
0
∫ βv+ψ
0
fu,v(u, v)dudv, (36)
with β =
(
2RthγIE
)
/γB and ψ =
(
2Rth − 1
)
/γB .
The derivation of analytical expressions for these metrics
seems challenging, if not impossible, for the general case of
Rician fading. However, reasonably tractable expressions can
be obtained in the Rayleigh case for the OP of secrecy capacity.
Following similar steps as those described in Section IV-B we
can obtain
OPSC = 1−
∫ ∞
0
g(v)dv, (37)
with
g(v) = αI0 (α
√
vp)K0
(
α
√
2ψ/α+ v(2βα+ 1)
)
. (38)
The asymptotic secrecy capacity can also be approximated as
CS ≈CB − CE , (39)
≈ log2(γB)− t(ρ=0) − CE . (40)
where now CB is the capacity of an uncorrelated product
channel, the parameter t(ρ=0) is given in (15) and CE can be
calculated be computed as in Section III.
D. Numerical evaluation
We will now move to the numerical evaluation of the per-
formance metrics in the aforementioned scenarios. Let us first
begin with the case (i) on which the energy and legitimate
information links are correlated. In Fig. 6, we represent the
average secrecy capacity for a fixed average SNR at Bob,
assuming different propagation conditions (LOS and non-LOS)
and different values of ρ. Because the energy and legitimate
information links are identically distributed, we use the same
value of the Rician K parameter to quantify their LOS condition.
We consider that the eavesdropper’s link is non-LOS (i.e.,
Rayleigh), and set γE = 5dB for the case of independent energy
and legitimate information links. Because we are comparing the
average secrecy capacity for a target value of γB , the transmit
power PT is reduced due to correlation for a given set-up and the
average SNR at the eavesdropper is reduced by a factor ∆PO.
This case, on which the true average SNR at Eve is assumed, is
represented by solid lines in the plot. For the sake of comparison,
we also include with dashed lines the case on which γE is
(incorrectly) kept invariant regardless of ρ for a fixed γB , i.e.,
the average SNR at the eavesdropper side is artificially larger
than its true SNR for ρ > 0. As in the previous section, the
infinite series expression within the bivariate Rician distribution
is truncated to 10 terms.
We extract several important insights from the observation of
Figs. 6 and 6: (i) for the investigated configuration, correlation
is detrimental for secrecy capacity in the high SNR regime; (ii)
the asymptotic approximation given by (31) is very accurate in
the medium and high SNR regimes, whereas that obtained with
(32) becomes tight only in the high SNR regime; (iii) the impact
of correlation is lowered as the LOS condition is increased; (iv)
neglecting the impact of correlation on the average SNR at Eve
causes that the secrecy rate is underestimated compared to the
true SNR case. Importantly, because correlation increases fading
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Fig. 6. Average secrecy capacity CS vs. γB , for different values of the
correlation coefficient ρ and LOS conditions. Solid lines correspond to the case
on which γE = 5dB for ρ = 0, and then reduced by a factor ∆PO. Dashed
lines indicate the incorrect case where γE = 5 dB regardless of ρ. Markers
correspond to MC simulations, and the theoretical expressions in (26) have been
used to generate the dashed and solid line plots.
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Fig. 7. Exact and approximate average secrecy capacity CS vs. γB , for
different values of the correlation coefficient ρ and LOS conditions. For the
eavesdropper’s channel γE = 5dB for ρ = 0, and then reduced by a factor
∆PO. Solid lines indicate the exact theoretical expressions in (26), dash-dotted
lines indicate the approximate expressions using (31) and dotted lines indicate
the approximate expressions using (32). Markers correspond to MC simulations.
severity of the legitimate link but also indirectly decreases the
average SNR at Eve, it could be the case that the latter effect
dominates over the former and correlation may be beneficial for
capacity. In order to better visualize this, we represent in Fig.
8 the average secrecy capacity normalized to that obtained with
ρ = 0.
We see that as the average SNR at Bob is reduced, correlation
turns out being beneficial for the average secrecy capacity, as we
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Fig. 8. Average secrecy capacity CS normalized to that when ρ = 0 vs. γB ,
for different values of the correlation coefficient ρ and LOS conditions. Solid
lines correspond to the case on which γE = 5dB for ρ = 0, and then reduced
by a factor ∆PO. Dashed lines indicate the incorrect case where γE = 5
dB regardless of ρ. Markers correspond to MC simulations, and the theoretical
expressions in (26) have been used to generate the dashed and solid line plots.
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Fig. 9. OP of secrecy capacity CS vs. γB , for different values of the correlation
coefficient ρ and LOS conditions, with Rth = 1 bps/Hz.. Solid lines correspond
to the case on which γE = 5dB for ρ = 0, and then reduced by a factor ∆PO.
Dashed lines indicate the incorrect case where γE = 5 dB regardless of ρ.
Markers correspond to MC simulations, and the theoretical expressions in (27)
and (29) have been used to generate the dashed and solid line plots.
can obtain a larger secrecy rate than in the case of independent
links. Such effect is intensified in the case of not having LOS
between the legitimate peers, although note that this corresponds
to a relative increase in capacity. Interestingly, when the true
average SNR at Eve is not considered, the secrecy rates seem
always lower than those obtained with ρ = 0.
In Fig. 9, we now pay attention to the OP of secrecy capacity,
for the same set of parameters previously considered in Figs 6
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Fig. 10. Average secrecy capacity CS vs. γB , for different values of the
correlation coefficient ρ and LOS conditions. Solid lines correspond to the case
on which γE = {5, 10}dB for ρ = 0, and then enlarged by a factor ∆PO.
Dashed lines indicate the incorrect case where γE = {5, 10} dB regardless of
ρ. Markers correspond to MC simulations, and the theoretical expressions in
(35) have been used to generate the dashed and solid line plots.
and 8 and Rth = 1 bps/Hz. Similar observations can be made
as those in the previous figures: correlation is detrimental for
physical layer security in the operational range of OP values,
although performance improves with LOS condition for the
legitimate link. We also confirm that the impact of correlation
in the true average SNR at the eavesdropper’s end is beneficial
from a physical layer security perspective, compared to the
erroneous situation on which correlation is neglected on γE .
Now, we will evaluate the secrecy performance of the scenario
(ii) that considers correlation between the energy and wiretap
links. As in the previous configuration, we quantify the impact of
correlation on physical layer security through two performance
metrics: average secrecy capacity and OP of secrecy capacity.
In Fig. 10, we evaluate the average secrecy capacity in LOS
and non-LOS conditions, for different values of the correlation
coefficient ρ. We assume that the link between Alice and Bob is
of non-LOS nature (i.e., subject to Rayleigh fading). Because
the effect of LOS in the energy and eavesdropper’s links is
not as important as in the scenario in subsection IV-B, we use
different values for the average SNR at the eavesdropper in order
to improve the readability of the figure. We see that the average
secrecy capacity is decreased as correlation grows, being this
effect specially noteworthy in the high-SNR regime, and when
K = 0. Unlike in the previous scenario, there is no range of
SNR values on which correlation improves secrecy capacity.
We also note that neglecting the impact of correlation on the
average SNR at Eve would lead to the incorrect conclusion
that correlation is beneficial for physical layer security in this
scenario, as indicated by the curves in dashed lines.
Let us now move to the evaluation of the OP of secrecy
capacity in Fig. 11. We use the same set of parameters as in
5 10 15 20 25 30
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
K = 4, γEρ=0 = 10dB
K = 0, γEρ=0 = 5dB
γB (dB)
O
P
S
C
ρ = 0
ρ = 0.5
ρ = 0.99
5 10 15 20 25 30
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
K = 4, γEρ=0 = 10dB
K = 0, γEρ=0 = 5dB
γB (dB)
O
P
S
C
ρ = 0
ρ = 0.5
ρ = 0.99
Fig. 11. OP of secrecy capacity CS vs. γB , for different values of the correlation
coefficient ρ and LOS conditions, with Rth = 1 bps/Hz. Solid lines correspond
to the case on which γE = {5, 10}dB for ρ = 0, and then enlarged by a
factor ∆PO. Dashed lines indicate the incorrect case where γE = {5, 10}
dB regardless of ρ. Markers correspond to MC simulations, and the theoretical
expressions in (36) and (37) have been used to generate the dashed and solid
line plots.
Fig. 10, and a secrecy outage rate threshold Rth = 1 bps/Hz.
We now see that in the high-SNR regime, i.e., in the low OP
operation zone, the secrecy performance is virtually agnostic
to correlation. It is only when we move to higher values of
OP, i.e., lower values of the SNR at Bob, when we can notice
that correlation is slightly detrimental for physical layer security
(see zoomed area in the figure). We also note that almost no
effects are observed for the LOS configuration, compared to the
case of all-Rayleigh fading. Finally, we observe that the OP of
secrecy capacity that would be obtained by neglecting the effect
of correlation on the average SNR at Eve would again induce the
false intuition that correlation improves physical layer security
performance – which is not the case in this second scenario.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated the effect of correlation between the energy
and information links in EH devices in the context of wireless
powered communications. By rigorously quantifying the impact
of correlation on the capacity of a WPC link, we showed that
correlation causes an effective increase on the mean and variance
of the receive SNR for a fixed transmit power – or similarly, it
allows to reduce the system power budget for a target average
SNR at the receiver. In the latter case, correlation degrades
capacity of a point-to-point WPC link. Now, when considering
the effect of correlation on a physical layer security set-up, we
showed that in some cases correlation turns out being beneficial
from a secrecy capacity perspective. We also established that
neglecting the impact of correlation on the average SNRs at
the legitimate and eavesdropper’s ends may cause that incorrect
conclusions are extracted related to the role of correlation
9between the energy and information links for physical layer
security. Future research activities in this line will include the
consideration of non-ideal energy harvesting devices, as well as
the derivation of reasonably tractable analytical expressions for
the secrecy performance metrics, a rather intricate problem from
a mathematical point of view.
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